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I. INI'RODUCTION 
ACCORDING to Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Samuelson, 1 it is 
basic economics that 
[Gamblin&] involves simply sterile transfors of money or goods between 
individuals, CRating no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, 
gambling does nevertheless absorb tillle and reso~. When pursued beyond 
the limits of recreation, where the main purpose after all is to "kill" time. 
pmbJing subtracts tiom the national income.1 
Similarly, from a political science/ecOnomic viewpoint, Professor Jack 
Vim Del Slik has summarized these basic principles echoing much of the 
academic community: "[State-sponsored gambling] produces no product, no 
new wealth, 'and so it makes no genuine contribution to economic develop-
ment."' 
Government leaders of the United States are also beginning to raise some 
concerns. For example, in 1992, U.S. Senator Paul Simon ofIllinois-a state 
which has rapidly" legalized various gambling activities-read into the 
Congressional Record an article written by an authoritative economics 
professor.4 According to Senator Simon. the article confirmed his own 
instinct that "Communities and States and the Nation should be careful when 
• Professor, University ofDlinois; A.B. 1972, William &: Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, 
Univmity of Georgia; Ll..M. 1978. SID 1981, University of Vqinia; Associate, Program in 
Anns Control. Disarmament, and lntemational Security, University of Dlinois. 
1. Paul Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Ecoaomic ScieDce in 1970. 
2. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMtcs 425 (lOth cd. 1976). 
3. Jack R. Va Der Slit, ugali::ed Galllbling: Prwdt:lltJry Policy, IWNOIS IssUES, Mar. 
1990, at 30, 30. This particular article was printed in a publication directed toward employees 
of the lURe of Illinois. Dlinois is a developing pmblina state. 
4. 138 CoNG. REc. S 187 (dailyed. Jan. 22, 1992) (reprinted article by Economies Professor 
Earl GrinOIs, Gambling &'$" 't Pay: /1 Costs. . . Betting Parlors Sipho" Off More Money From 
COIllllUUlIlIu than They Generate, ST. Lotns PosT-DIsPATCH, Nov. 12, 1991, at C3). 
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they look for easy revenue CW'eS that may do more damage than they 
realize."' Based upon these concerns, in 1993, Senator Simon introduced to 
the Senate the Gambling Impact Study Commission Acf' which was designed 
to ·conduct a thorough study of all matters relating to the impact of gambling 
on States, political subdivisions of States, and Native American tribes,"7 and 
to explore "possible alternative S01lTCeS of revenue.'" 
Similarly, on September 21, 1994, Congressman John J. LaFalce, the Chair 
of the House Committee on Small Business, held a hearing on the socio-
economic impacts of the trend toward legaJind gambling activities.9 At the 
hearing, the committee received testimony from various experts, all of whom 
criticized the impacts legalized gambling activities inflict upon social-welfare 
budgets,IO the crimiDal justice system,11 small businessesl2 and the UD;ited 
States economic base. 13 Among other conclusions presented, legalized 
gambling~ a strategy for economic development-was thoroughly 
discredited. 14 Indeed, at the start of the hearing, Congressman LaFalce 
expressed his own Concerns for the issue,15 and expressed a need for a 
national policy.16 Howevet; despite these expressed concerns, legalized 
gambling activities continue to spread across the nation. 11 
S. Id. (statement of Sen. Paul Simon). 
6. S. 1720, 103d Cong., 1st Sou. (1993). 
7. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
8. Id. § 4(a)(2)(B). 
9. See generally '1M Nationalltilpact of Casino Gambling Prollfonztion: Hetll'ings Before 
the House COIIIIII. on Small BusineR, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-32 (1994) (hereiDafter Congo 
H6tl1'lng]. 
10. See. e.g •• Cong. H ... Ing. npranote 9. at 82-86 (statement of Valerie C. Lorenz, Ph.D., 
Compulsive Gambling CIr). The only geuerally positive testimony was by a local administrator 
~ Tunica, Mississippi who focused on the initial economic Bash in the local economy and not 
on the regional economy. Id. at SO-55 (testimony of Webster C. Fnaklin, Tunica County, 
Milsissippi). 10 contrast, the "expert testimony" WIll quite negative. Eg.. Id. at 42-49, 56-70, 
71-76, 82-88. 
11. See Cong. /ktnlng, SIIp1'tI note 9, at 14-18 (testimoDy of Jeffi")' L. Bloomber&. State's 
Atty. Lawrence County. S:O.). 
12. See Cong. HUlTing. 811p1'tl note 9, at 33-35 (statement of Congressman Richard R 
Baker). 
13. See Cong. Hearing. IJIfJrtl note 9, at 4-8 (testimony of Professor Robert Goodman, 
UDivenity of Massachusetts). 
14. See Cong. HearlIIg. SIIp1'tI note 9, at 57, 76. 81. 86, 88. 100-01, I05-Q6; 
IS. Congo Hearing. npt'tI note 9, at 1-2 (introduCfOry S1atemeDt of Coapessman John J. 
LaFalce). . 
16. Cong. HUlTing. npra note 9, at 13 (_emcmt of Qmsressman John J. LaFalce). 
17. See. e.g., Terry Ganey &: Mark SchUnkmmm, Hancock 0 Out: Slot Games In, ST. LOUIS 
PosT-DlSPA1OI, Nov. 9, 1994, at A6.[bereinafter Slot Gtzma In] ("After three tries, fUll-blown 
riverboat pmbliDs in Minouri became a rality u voters approved the 'pmos of Chance' 
amendment 54 to 46 percent. j. Multiple re-votes are commonly utWzed • a ItrateIY by 
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With the legalization of various types of gambling activities sweeping the 
United States and much of the international community. the issue is whether 
this trend constitutes an economic boom. a harmless recreational pastime," or 
an actual threat to the strategic economic base of the industrialized world. and 
in particul8l; of the United StateS.11 Business-economic history indicates that 
the legalization of gambling activities precipitates a classic "boom and busf' 
economic cycle. 19 Accordingl~ this Article concludes that because widespread 
legalized gambling activities represent such a threat to the strategic U.S .. 
economic base and to stability of expectations,20 Congress should seriously 
consider federal legislation to re-crlmina1ize or severely limit practically all 
types of legalized gambling activit)' As an interim measure, Congress should 
consider withholding federal funds from those s1Btes intent on experimenting 
with legalized gambling activities, for individual states should not be allowed 
to engage in a type of economic secession21 which threatens the nation's 
leplized pmbling proponents to wear-down and out-spend their oppoDeDlB. See Id.: He also 
infra DOte 24 (sMog examples of multiple re-votes in different states. IS recorded in the 
congressioDal hearing on Sept 21, 1994). 
18. See pMrolly, John W. Kindt. 71re Economic Jmpacu of Legalized Gambling Activities, 
43 DRAJC£ 1.. REv. S3 (1994) [hereinafter Economic Impacts}. 
] 9. Set Cong. Hearing. supra note 9, at 77 (stltement of Professor John W. Kindt, 
University of Dlinois). 
20. 1bis J*dcular Article is summary in lcope, but. it was conceived with~ the penumbra 
of the McJ)oupllLassweJl model for decisicm-making. In the II'eaS of IepJ and lovemmeJlt 
policy, which subsume stratesic socio-economic IDd business concerns, the classic decision-
making modoIs were formulated by the post legal realists, in particul... Professor Myres 
McDoupi 8Dd Professor Haroid LIssweIl who postUlated a coaceptuaI fiamewort for lepl 
decision-raakiDg in • landmark article directed iowanllepl educamrs and law profinsors. Harold 
D. Lasswell " Myna S. McDougal, up! EtbIcatiDn tJIIIl Public Policy: ProfeuiONll7raining 
I" tIM Public InIerut, 52 YALE U. 203 (1943); I.' "Iso Harold D. Lllsawell &: Myres s. 
McDoupI; CrltuIa for Q Theory abtnd Law, 44 S. CALIF. L REv. 362 (1971); Myres S. 
McDousIll, ./urlIpnIde1lCf for a Fru SDcJ.ty, 1 GA. L REV. 1 (1966); 101m W. KiDdt, .An 
Allalysis Of upl Education Ntd Bus_s EductltlOIt Within 77hr Conte%t Of .4 J.D./MBA. 
ProgIYIIII, 31 J.l.EGAL EDue. 512, 517-18 (1981); JoIm W. Kindt. An Analysis Of uga/ 
EtbIcaIit>n And Bvshtass Education Within 7JIr CorttaI Of .A. J.D.lMBA Programme, 13. LAw 
TEACHER 12, 14-16 (1979). The decision-makiDs coacepIS which McDougal and Lasswell 
introduced were 1ater expanded to include intemadODBlIaw and U.S. domesdc law, IS theIe areas 
interfaced with "policy-orienled jurisprudence." See John N. Moore. Prolegomenon to w 
.htrl6p1'f1d1nce 0/ Myres McDougal and HtlI'Dld wswll, 54 VA. L. REv. 662 (1968); 17Ie 
Lasswil-McDowgal EllUrprise: Toward II World Public Order of II1IJIIIIn Dignity, "14 VA. J. 
INT'L 1.. 53' (1974). . 
21. s.e RoBERT OooDMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBUNG AS A STRATEGY FOR EcoNoMIC 
I>EVSLOPMENT {Ctr_Econ. Development, U. Mass.-Amberst (1994» (bereiDafter CEO REPoRT]. 
This U.S. pmbUns study provides an authoritative IDIIysis of tbe s1I'Itegic economic costs of 
utiliziDs leplized gambling activities as a striteI)' for economic development: 
Gambling has pown in an ad hoc "copy cat" manner as states follow each others' leads, 
responcIinl to revenue shortfalls and the fear that neighboring states or Indian tribes will 
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entire economic base.22 
The strategic economic threat to the United States is immediate and should 
be addressed quickly before newly developing constituencies in the legalized 
gambling industry become widespread enough to dictate economic policy.23 
For example, the legalized gambling industry drafted a state constitutional 
referendum in Florida which aimed to ''mandate'' the introduction of casino-
style gambling activitie~en into communities which voted unanimously 
against such activities.24 It is thereby not surprising that testimony presented 
siphon off their pmbling dollars. . .. Once gambling ventures are Jesalized and 
IOVCl'DlllODts become dependent on their revenues, the fUture form and spread of pmbJinJ 
within a state becomes extremely difficult to control. . 
Id. at 16. 
22. Congo Hearing, ftIJ'I'D note 9, at 10 (oral1estimony of Economics Professor Earl L. 
(lrinols, University ofDlinois). According to Professor Grinols, the threat exists because of the 
tact tbat: 
Id. 
State representativa have DO incentive to view pmblinJ in terms ofits overall eft'ect on 
tlunountry. To [states] it is a way to raise tax money-hopefUlly iTom people of 
neiJbborina States who will take their problems bact home-even though the social costs 
for an additional dollar of tax raised tbroup pmbling is in the I1IIlp ofS3.S0 per dollar 
raised, complRd to ODIy $1.45 for raisins taxes the old fMhioned war, by raising taxes. 
23. For an authoritative analysis supporting this recommendation, see CEO REPoRT, 81IprD 
note 21, at 18. Many policymakers are concerned that leplized pmbling interests have large 
budpts to support efforts to lepJize vlrious forms of pmbling duougbout the United States. 
For example, New Jersey has restrictions proIu"itins political contributions &om casinos. Id. 
By comparison, in 1990 Dlinois lifted its ban on CODtributions ftom racetracks and had DO 
limif.etion« on political contn'butioDs by interests promoting Ieplized pmbliDg. Al) such 
contributions were lepl. Between January I, 1993 and April 10, 1994, the Cbicaso Sun-Times 
reportod that Dlinois Governor James "Edpr and state legislators . . . [had] m:cived at least 
567:4.772 ftom pmblinc iDterests." not including "1eDS of thousands of dollars in donations ftom 
1awyers,1obbyists and consultants who are represoutinl pmblinJ clients." Mark Brown & Ray 
LoDJ, Ganrbliag: .A PoIidcIllJackpot: New Frmding Powrhtnue A.1ds 2 in 3 Legislators, CHI. 
SUN TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, at lAo 16A. 
. 24. $e. Martin Dyckman, Allskading 1M Public, ST. PEmRsBURO TIMEs, Nov. I, 1994, at 
A 13. Proposition 8 on Ibe Florida ballot for November 8, 1994, would have initially allowed 47 
casinos in Florida. The public relations tactics of the proponents for 1eplized casinos \Wl'e 
criticized in the pnss for miIrepJesentiDg the effect and impact of Proposition 8. ld For 
example, during the week of November 1, 1994, a commerciaJ supporting lcpli2:led casinos in 
Florida ran with the identifier of a former "Chief Jusdce, Florida State Supreme Court (Ret.)" and . 
read as follows: 
This is the State Ccmstitution. As a chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court, I 
worked to uphold it. . . . When I wrote Proposition 8, Limited Casinos, I made sure that 
strict limits on the number of casinos were put Jisht here. That means politicians won't 
have the IIIthority to cbaDp or weaken Ibe limits. OoIy you can put the limt1s in the 
Ccmstitudon by voq yes on limited casinos. And ODIy a vote by you can clumse those 
limits. With Limited CasUios. you have the fiDaJ say. 
Dyc:lanan, 1IlprD. at A13. Accordins to one crlticalaccount in the press. "[t]he effect of the 
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at the 1994 congressional hearing indicated that in the future franchised 
legalized gambling parlors may be as widespread as the fast-food hamburger 
chains are today.:ZS 
Thus, the gravamen of the 1994 hearing was that U.S. policymakers should 
heed the wake-up call to develop a national policy on increased legalized 
commercial-wbether intended or not-{was] ... to wrap ... [the fonner cbiefjustice's] sleazy 
new clients in his old judicial robes." Id The ICCOUIlt fUrther noted that voters could easily take 
the justice's sta1ement to mean that there could be" slot Dl8Chines on every street comer unless 
they votedfor Proposition a: 
Id 
1be fact is tbIt casino pmbiing is not only against existing Florida law but, in the 
opinion of Attorney Ocneral Bob Buaerwonh, apiDst the praent Constitution as well. 
The present limit on cuinos is zero, 0, none. If VOIm"S fall for . . . [the former chief 
justice',] line, the new limit will be 47. That is • far cry from O. 
WhIt's more,30 of those casiDos ft raerved, forever, for the existing horse tracks, 
dog trICks and jai alai plants. . Another, on MiaJiu Beach, IS well described by my 
coDe ... Jeanny Deem lut weekend, is reserved for I mDlionaire German carpetbagger 
... , who. maneuvered Roberts into a corner. These people would have a perpetual 
monopoly on 31 of the 47 licenses, and for .•. [the former chief justice] to cast that as 
a virtue in bis scheme is for him to take the voters IS blubbering fools. Finally, local 
voters who might not want casinos in their neighborhoods will have NO SAY if ... [the 
former chief justice's] ingenious proposition is approved statewide. 
Leplized Pf'Ibling proponents reportedly hired finDs to get this referendum question on the 
ballot at • cost ofS2 to $3 per sipature. See. I.g .• Casilf08 GrofI/J to Allie Up SJ-Mil/ionfor 1Y 
Ads. ST. P!mRSBURO TIMES, Jun. 2a, 1994. at 84. The chairman of the casino drive reportedly 
said that "'the proliferation of ballot initiatives has inflated the cost of professional petition 
peddlers to S2.2S a signature." Iii. Placinl Proposition 8 on the blliot requiied 429.42a certified 
signatures at • cost of approximately $3 million. Id. . 
The public relations budget for convincing the voters to approve this referendum question on 
November 8, 1994. was apperendy SI6.S mil1ion--sipdficanty more than the combined budgets 
of the two IUbematoriaI candid8tes, Job Bush and Governor Lawton ChiJes. Louis Lavelle, 
Yoters!Ma1 Lou to 0#;nD8: GtIInbIing IJtd:en Lo. Dapltc 116.5 MIllion Campaign. TAMPA 
1'RJBUNE, Nov. 9,1994, at 1, S [bereiDafter,s16.5 MIIlloIlCampaign]; CtllinoIGambl,. tmd Lose. 
Again, FLoIuDA SUN, at AI, A6 (SI6.7 mUlion raised.by cIIino proponents and $1.6 million 
raised by opponents). 
SimillJ' sceaarios and multiple re-votes have occurred in other states: 
The proposal for casino pmblina in Oica&o bas beeII defeated three times in Illinois, but 
the prosnosis is that it will be brousbt up .. and apin antiJ the pmbling promoters 
succeed. . . . In api1e of mt1lious of doU .. in pmbling Idvertising, MissouriIDS voted 
down a cbIDge to their CODItitution ill April [1994] to allow pmos of c:bance, but the 
q..stioD is beins put back on the ballot dlIs fall, 6 moOtbs Iller. The phenomenon of 
stasiD8 multiple revotes [if gambIIas is defelted] is • acenarlo being played out in Detroit. 
Iowa and other places. . •. Is this good Govermnent? 
Congo Hetlrlng. IIIpI'QDOte 9. at 10 (oni testimony ofEconoanics Professor Earl L. Orinois, 
University of Dlinois). 
25. Sa Congo H,arlng. nlprtlnote 9, at 9-10 (oral testimony ofEconomics Professor Earl L 
Grinols, University of DJinois). 
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gambling activities.26 Furthermore, the potential economic drain which the 
advent of legalized gambling activities·has on the pre-existing economy is SO 
lalge that states should be pro~bited from questionable exemptions de jUl"e of 
legalized gambling activities from common anti1rust principles. At a 
minimum,a "foresightfu1 national policy should be developed to counteractthe 
false short term incentives .for states to individualJyintroduce gambling to their 
cOmmon Jong tenn bann. tm A review of the strategic U.S. economy and the 
business-econOmicimpacts ofwidespreadleplizedgambling activities supports 
these recommendations. 
II. THE S'rRAT£Olc U.S. ECONOMIC BASE AND nm BusJNESSlEcONOMlC 
IMPAcrs OF nm LEGALlZAnON OF GAMBUNG ACTMTlES .. 
In 1974, sixty-one percent of the U.S. public participated in legaliRd 
gambling activities;» at that time, the total legal wager w8s only 
$17.3 billion.29 By 1993, 00wevm; the U.s. public legally wagered 
$394.3 biJlion,JO approximateb' SISO billion more 1han the U.S. Defense 
Budget] I That yem; the total U.S. consumer dollars "won" by legalized 
gambling operators as generated revenues amounted to $34.7 billion,32 
including $12.8 billion in gross revenues to the state lotteries." In other 
words, the consumer dollars drained ftom pre-existing businesses and 
redirected toward-or ~" by--legalized gambling operators increased by 
2,100% since 1974.34 
26. COIIg. H«Iring, npYIDOta 9. at 13 (lhdemeDt ofHeariDg 0Iainnan LaFalce. stating that 
~ isa cryiDaaeed for. D8IioDaI polic:y.j. 
27. Cong. HttIrlng.,.,. note 9. It 11 (writteD tutiJmay by EcoDimics Professor Earl L. 
0riD01s. Uaiversity ofmiaois) . 
. 28. Beary R. Lesieur. CoInprIl8iw~. SOcmY.May/June, 1992, at 43, (hereimdter 
CoInpIilIJve Gtlmbllng]. 
29. U.s. COMNrsSDI ON 1HE REV. OF THE 'NAT'L PoL'y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING 
IN AMERICA, 630064 (U.s.Oov·t PriD1iDa Of[ 1976) [berIdDaltIlr COMM'N ON GAMBLING]. 
30. Eupne M. .0uistiIMeD.1IaNIIe '" 17./lHtoSJHB: RnaIIe q, 14.m to 134.7B, 
lMT'L GAMINO a:WAGllUNO BUs., Ma. 5, J994. at 14. 15·[IleRIader HIBIdle ltI). 
31. OFF. MGM'T &: BuDaBT. BuDGET OF tHE UNnED STATES GovI!RNMEN'r: FISCAL YEAR. 
1994 apps. 5 * 6 (budaet MhorIty is S25O. 7 biIIicm, outlay is 1265.2 billion for 1994). 
32. Htmdlc ltJ • .Irf1IYl BOte 30 •• 19 (tIble 2). 
33. Id. By COIIIp8riaoa. worldwidele1ary "sales". 1993 __ SI3.7 biWon. Lotle7y SIlIes 
ror/dwlde .1&p W.?ll m '9J.INT'L.6AMINo &: WAOI!ldNOBUS .. ·MIy 5, 1994, It 1,30. 1'be 
~ States WIll first JaloUlry ...... with S25.3 billion fiJDowedbr Germlay (S9.7bi1UoD). 
Japan (S6.3bi11ioD).SpaiD (SS.5 biUioIl), Fraace (SS.SbIIIion). IDd Caaada ($3.7 biIHoIl). Id . 
• 30. 
34. ThiI preII1ID88 tbat 1be --'perceDt (approximately 9%) of thelllllOVllt 1eplly 
wapRd in 1914 or SI.57 billion .. "woD.llln 1993. tile 8IDOUIlt "won" WIll S34.7 biHion 
(a 14.a iftcnue hID 1992). IIandIe t;1, 8IIpnI1lOIe 30, at 14, 19, table 2. Tbelefbre the 
iDcreaso from 1974 to 1993 WIll IppIOximately2,IOO%. Ofcoune, these IlU1IIben are not 
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If this trend continues throughout the United States, within a short period 
of time, these numbers-high as they are-could easily begin to increase 
exponentiall~ In addition, it has been estimated that the net economic effect 
could be equivalent to an. additional recession every eight to fifteen years.3S 
If this phenomenon were to combine with a regular cyclical recession, the U.S. 
economy could face double jeopardy. 
In addition, a brief consideration of other U.S. economic data lends support 
to the suggestion noted earlier by economist Paul Samuelson that "gambling 
subtracts from the national .income.,,)6 Specifically, in 1992, the most recent 
year for which statistics are available, the U.S. national income was reported 
at $4,837 billion37 whereas the gross legal wager was $330 billion31 and the 
gross revenues retained by the gambling industry were $29.9 billion.39 
Significantly, while the gross legal wager and gross industry revenues 
increased 8.4%40 and 12%,41 respectivel3' over the figures reported in 1991, 
the 1992 national income increased only 6.4% over the prior yem:42 Initially, 
these relative increases' in the 1992 gambling totals may appear small when 
compared to the U.S. national income. Howevet; they are actually quite 
significant; in fact, the gambling figures increased in proportional significance 
to the national income in 1992 becauSe the U.S. gambling industry is presently 
growing more rapidly than any other induStry in the United States.43 
adjusted for inflation. 
35. See Congo Hearing, supra note 9, at 73 (written testimony of Economics Professor 
Earl L. Orinols, University of Dlinois). 
36. SAMUELSON, supra note 2, at 425. Since 65% or more of the "gambling dollar" is 
wagered by 10% of the public, this market segment is theoretically wagering "beyond the limits 
of recreation" and would ostensibly constitute a fairly direct subtraction trom the national income. 
For a preliminmy analysis of the issues involving the percentages ofme public who will gamble 
and how much, see Economic Impacts, IUpraoote 18, at 60-61,73-15,71. 
37. BuR. EcoN. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CUJUlENT BUSINESS, Jan. 
1994, at 11 (1994) (table 1.14). That year, the gross domestic product WIS reported at 56,038 
bnIion, and the gross n~ product was $6,046 billion. Id. at 10 (table 1.9). 
38. Eugene M. Christiansen, The 1992 Gross AlU'lllai Wager 0/ the U.s. Part I: Handle, 
INT'L GAMING &: WA.G£RJNO Bus., July-Aug. 1993, at 12. [hereinafter Wager Part 1]. This 
figure amounts to seven percent of the U.S. natioDal income. 
39. Eugene M. Christiansen, 17Ie 1992 Gross Annual Wager of the U.S. Part II: Revenue, 
INT'L GAMING &: WAGE1UNG Bus., Aug.-Sept 1993, at 12..[hcrtinafter Wager PQ1't 11]. This 
figure amounts to .63% of the U.S. national income. 
40. Wager Part I, SJlfN'a note 38, at 12. 
41. Wager Part II, ntpl"Qoote 39, at 12. 
42. The U.S. national income in 1991 was $4,544 billion. BUit ECoN. ANALYSIS, U.S. 
DEp'T COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Jan. 1993, at 10 (table 1.14). In 1992, it 
increased by 6.4% to S4,837 billion. BUR.. EcoN. ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 11 (table 1.14). 
43. Richard Griffin, Feeding FQ1IS' Greed Cowd Save the Game, TOR. STAR, Mar. 5, 1995, 
at B1. 
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Furthermore, although gambling has just begun to expand in earnest, its sales 
already equal approximately two and one-half percent of Gross Domestic 
Product.44 
In any event, macro-economictheories and concomitant economic formulae 
do not address this growing phenomenon. With the policy changes in the 
fonner Soviet Union and elsewhere, the strategic U.S. economic base will also 
change rapidly in the next few years, and the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (and its economic "multipliers")"s as well as other economic 
agencies will need to keep pace. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers should query 
whether an economy which is becoming so heavily influenced and dependent 
on legalized gambling activities-which involve "creating no new money or 
goodsH46-is similar to the oil-dependent U.S. economy of the early 1970s, 
which was vulnerable to the 1973-74 Arab Oil Embargo.47 
From a historical economic perspective, the "boom and bust" economic 
cycles created by legalized gambling activities appear throughout economic 
history. but the two most relevant and most recent occurred in the United 
S~ during the nineteenth ce~4I At the beginning of the 1800's, the 
United States had already interfaced its economic base with the gambling 
philosophy-primarily via lotteries.49 While scandals provided a focus for 
gambling opponents,SO these opponents had their positions bolstered by the 
socio-economic negatives which necessarily accompany legalized gambling 
activities. In most historical scenarios, these business/economic negatives were 
reflected in a decrease in the quality of life which translated into a loss of net 
jobs, the creation of Iqe social problems, and the necessary increase in 
various taxes to address these problems. Sl 
.44. Congo Hearing, SIIJH'tl note 9. at 73 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L. 
Grlnols, University of IDinois). 
4S. As of 1994, for example, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis had no economic 
multipliers for the legalized gamblinglriverboat industry. The CEO Report indicated that the 
multipliers for legalized gambling activities at'Cnegativc. CEO REPoRT,lIIpranote 21, at 49-S0; 
s,e Congo Hearing, supra note 9, at 81 (statement of Professor John W. Kindt, University of 
ruinois). 
46. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 424. 
47. See John W. Kindt, Investment Interdependence as a Potential Response by the United 
States 10 FfIltlre Arab Oil Embargoes, 7 Ausnw.. Y.B. INT'L L 279 (1982). 
48. For a summary of tile historical bacqroWld involving the"cyclicarlegalization and re-
crlminalization of gambling in the United Stata, sec L Nelson Rose. '[h Impact Of ..4merican 
Laws On Foreign ugal Gambling, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. 1. INT'L It; COMP; L. 129, 159-66 (1986) 
(hereinafter ugal Gambling]. 
49. Id. at 159. 
50. Id. at ISS, 159-63. 
51. See generally Economic Impacts, supra DOte 18. The basic negative impacts do not 
change, although historical and dcmograpbical dift'erences can provide for multiple variations. 
• 
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Accordingl~ most legalized gambling activities were re-criminalized in the 
1820's and 1830's.52 After the American Civil \\V, gambling activities once 
again became fashionable and followed the expanding frontier.53 Howevet; 
the same socio-economic problems occurred, and with recuning scandals as 
catalysts, virtually all gambling activities were re-criminalized by 1910. 
The United States is now in a new, "third" wave of legalized gambling 
activities.54 Cynics would argue that if the United States wished to improve 
its economic position relative to the rest of the world, it should re-criminalize 
practically all legalized gambling activities in the United States, but encourage 
U.S. companies to conduct their gambling activities in international markets." 
While the ethical questions of pursuing this latter option are beyond the scope 
of this analysis, widespread legalized gambling activities are nevertheless 
theoretically crippling the national econom)t 
In the 1800's, the strategic economiclmilitary consequences were less 
destructive and less absolute; but in the modem world, the United States and 
its allies cannot afford to . experiment with their strategic economies by 
elevating legalized gambling activities to the level where a strategic economic 
"boom and bust" cycle" or a classic "speculative economic bubble"57 could 
occutSl Unfortunatel~ because of the gambling industry and the vagaries of . 
the U.S. legal system" which protects the scope and speed with which the 
politic&! constituencies supporting the legalized gambling industry develop,6O 
such experiments may already be so far advanced tha1: they are beyond the 
control of U.S. policymakers. 
Due to several lauge socio-economic negatives which are associated with 
legalized gambling activities but which neither occur in nor accompany other 
types of industries, it· can be concluded that there are substantial 
business/economic reasons to believe that widespread (and even localized) 
legalized gambling activities are inherently recessionary in nature. These 
negatives include: modest increases in infrastructure costs,61 relatively high 
52. LQtII Gambling. SIIp1'Q note 48. at 159. 
53.' Id.at 159-60. 
54. lei. at 160-64. 
55. For. COIIIpIrison of worldwide lottery sales. see npra DOte 33. 
56. CEO REPoRT, nIfII'tI DOte 21, at 18. 
57. For example, the 1929 U.S. stockllUllket seeaario pnsen1IlUCh a babble. See PAUL A 
SAMUELSON &; W1LIJAM D. NoRDHAus. EcoNoMICS 204 (14th ed. 1992) C"Speoulative 
Bubbles"); SAMUELsoN. IIp'QDOte 2. at 424-25. $Ie_ Co",. Hear"", nlfll'tlnote 9. at 71-73 
(written teItimoDy ofEcouomics Profeseor BII'l L QrinoIs, Uniwrsity of mmois). 
58. s.. Steven D. Gold, It 'I Not a MINIt:Ie, It', a Mirap, ST. LmJs., Feb. 1994, at 28. 
59. Sa generally I. NELsoN RosE, GAMBuNo AND THE LAw (1986). 
60. CEO REPoRT, 8flP"tl note 21, at 18. 
61. Sa Id.. 16; EctHromic 11If/XlCIS.1UpI'II note 18 •• 72; Congo Hearing, nqmz note 9, at 
46 (1.eStimoDy of Jeffty L Bloomber& Slates Atty. Lawrence Co •• S.D.). 
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increases in regulatory costs,62 large costs to the criminal justice system,63 
and social-welfare and business-economic costs in the billions of dollars.64 
These business/economic costs can easily translate into recessionary pres-
sures" and lost jobs from the rest of the economy;66 significantly, these 
costs do not generally accompany other industries. . Furthermore, the net 
creation of jobs claimed by the legalized gambling industry is at best a 
breakeven proposition, 67 and the evidence suggests that net job losses can 
easily occur"--primarily because "consumer dollars" are drained from the 
rest of the economy.69 The literature frequently refers to this process as "ca-
62. See CEO REPoilT,lIIpI'QDOte 21, at 16; Economic Impacts, .nrpraDOte 18, • 72; Congo . 
Hearing, 8Up1'tl note 9, at 46 (testimony of Jeftiy L. Bloomberg, States Atty, Lawrence Co., 
S.D.). 
63. See. e.g., CEO REPoRT, ftIPIYlDOte 21, It 16; Economic I1II{JQCts, npranote 18, at 72; 
Congo Hearing, 8flP'a DOte 9, at 46 .(Jeffry L. BJ.oombers, States Atty, Lawrence Co., S.D.). 
64. See. e.g., MD. DEP'T HEALllI &: MENTAL HyGIENE, ALcoHoL " DIwG ABUSE ADMIN., 
TASK FORCE ON GAMBUNG ADDICnON IN MA1tYLAND (1990) (Valerie C. LoreDz &: Robert 
M. Politzer, co-cbain 1990) [hereiDafter cited as MAIlYLAND REPORT]. For example, 
M(P ]athoIogical gamblers cost Maryland and its citizeas about 51.S bUlion IIDIlUIlly in lost work 
productivity and embezzled, stolen or otherwise abused doUars." Id. It 2. '"The total cumulative 
iDcIebtedness of Maryland's pathological gamblers exceeds $4 billion." Id. Furthermore, 
untreated pathological aambliDg activities affects thousands of lives 8Dd costs Maryland billioDs 
of dollars. Id. See abo Cong. Hearing. 8fl[JrtJ note 9, at 83 (statement of Valerie C. ~ 
Pb.D., Compulsive GambHng Ctr.). 
65. See. e.g.. Cong. Hearing. 8fIJ1I'a DOte 9, at 10 (oral testimony of Economics Professor 
Earl L Orinols, University oflDinois) ("[TJbe social C08~ for an additional dollar ofa railed 
through pmbliDs is in the range of 53.50 per doBar raised, compared to only $1.45 tbr raisiDa 
taxes the old fashioned way. by raisins taxes.j. 
. 66. See. e.g., Congo Hearing. 8IIfI1'IJ note 9, at 34 (statement of Congressman Richard H. 
Baker). 
67. AccordiDg to a two-year study by Professor Robert Goodman at the University of 
Manachusetts, lC]asinos 'suck. mcmey out of the local economy' away from exiatiDg movie 
theatres, car dealerships, clothing shops IIDd aports 1I'eDIS." James Popkin &: K8lia Hetier, 
bterictl', Gambling Cree, U.S. NEws &: WORLD RIP., Mar. 14,1994, It 42-43,46. See also 
CEO REPoRT, 61IfH'tl note 21, at 51-55. 
68. 0riD0Is, Bhdf01' Wbtnlltg HawJ? RWerboat Ga1rJbIbtg .4nd Rsgional FMpID)llllMt And 
UnelllploymMt, 51 ILL. Bus. REv., Spring 1994, at 8-11 (iDdiCIItiDg DliDoia riverbom have not 
crutecI a net increue in employment IIDd may eYeD have COItuetjobs). Since pmhIina aetivities 
take jobs from the rest of tbe 1CODOIIl)'. the CIUdon ofjobl is an iuusory claim. This principle 
is so Italic that it is in tbe WORLD BOOK ENcYc1.OPEDIA. WOlUJ) BO(JK YEAR. BOOK 398 (1994) 
('"Tbe employment iDcre8Ies IU1IItiDs tom JDOIl pmbliDa operatioDS are illuJory. "). See also 
eong.lkarlng • .ntpranote 9, at 71 (written testimony of Economics Professor Earl L. Grinols, 
Univeraity of ruinois). 
69. 'Ibis busiaeasleoonomic principle is anotber principle which is so baie that it is in the 
WORLD BooK. ENCYcLoPmxA. WORLD BooIc YEAR Boc>K 398-400 (1994). 8ft nIfJI'fJ note 68 
and aecompanyiq text; CED REPoRT, IIfI/I1'IJ note 21, at 49-50. 
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nnibalization"'o of the pre-existing economy-including the pre-existing 
"tourist" economy.71 For example, a report from the Governor's Office in 
California reflected this transfer of dollars and its effect on the regional 
economy: 
In the midst of continued (and justified) concern over the emigration of 
businesses and productive taxpayers out of California, another, long-standing 
migration has been overlooked. That is the migration of dollars out of 
California to the casinos of Nevada. ... 
Gambling by Californ~ pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada, 
and probably adds about $8.1 billion-and 196,000 jobs-to the Nevada 
economy. counting the secondary employment it generates. This is a direct 
transfer of income and wealth from California to Nevada every year.12 
As of 1993, not one of the fifty states had a plan concerning the statewide 
development of various legalized gambling activities.73 The only baseline 
study was a 1976 federal report by the u.s. Commission on the Review of the 
National Policy Toward Gambling, entitled Gambling in America." This 
1976 report was apparently prompted by the proposed economic development 
of Atlantic City, New Jerse~ via the legalization of land-based casino 
gambling. Considering that in general the Atlantic City economy has 
significantly worsened since 1976.75 serious questions should be raised about 
extending this experiment nationwide. 
Because some demographics can easily allow the initial profit mmgins of 
many legalized gambling activities to be extremely huge," it should be 
70. CEO REPoRT, supra note 21, at 51; Cong. Hearing, supra note 9, at 87-88 (statement 
of Congressman Frank R. Wolf). &e also Congo Hearing, supra note 9. at 34 (statement of 
Congressnum Richard H. Balcer); Congo Hearing, supra note 9~ at 57 (statement of PrOfessor 
Robert Goodman, Hampshire C.) 
71. See, e.g., Press Release, Florida Dep'! Com., Sept. 19, 1994 (summarizing the 1994 
report by the Fla. Dep't Com.) ("A consistent result oftbe introduction of casino gambling has 
been the caanibalization ofpre-existing towism industry."). FLA. DEP'T CoM., IMPLICATIONS 
OF CAsINO <lA.MBUNG AS AN EcoNoMIc DEvELOPMENT STRATEGY (1994) [hereinafter cited as 
FLA. DEPOT CoM. REPoRT]. 
72. CAL. Gov'S OFF. PLAN & REsEAltCH, CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA: SUBSIDY, 
MoNOPOLY. AND CoMPETmVE EFFEcTs OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES-l (1992). 
73. CEO REPoRT, supra note 21, at 16. In 1994, however, the Florida Department of 
Colllmerceiuucd a report which indicaled that legalized casino-style gambling would 
"cannibalize- the pre-existing Florida ecooom.y. FLA. DEP'T CoM. REPoRT, IIIpra note 7 I, at S. 
74. CoMM'N ON GAMBLING, rupra note 29. 
75. S.epM,al/yOF1DR.QE STERNLIEB & lAMES W. HuGHEs, THE A11.ANI1c CITY GAMBLE 
95-110 (1983). 
76. For example, the largest hotel in the United States, the Excalibur in LIs Vegas, "stunned 
market 1ID8l)'StS by announcing it bad already paid off. .. [its] mortgage from operating revenues" 
in less than two years. James"Coates, Yegas' Tip to Chicago: Casino Is Family Fitn, CHI. TRm., 
Apr. 10, 1992, §I, at 1, 10. &e, e.g., Mary Ellen Podmolik, Empress hrve8lors Win Big, CHI. 
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anticipated that major U.S. corporations are not only pursuing opportunities in 
the realm of legalized gambling activities, but also divesting themselves of 
their traditional business lines in some instances:77 
As groWing numbers of people work in Ule gambling industry, and come 
to be economically dependent on it, new pro-gambling constituencies will 
develop to protect these jobs. This will make gambling ventures difficult for 
government to curtail or terminate." 
State and local governments are already utilizing taxpayer dollars to 
subsidize, and even maintain, some legalized gambling operations. This trend 
is projected to intensify and create new economic problems: 
A major result of market saturation bas been a tendency towards more lax 
government gamblingreguJation and public subsidies to help competing priVate 
gambling operations survive. There are likely to be serious economic and 
social costs to commwlities as the result of this boom and bust type of 
development. 79 
Furthermore, state and local governments have been enticed by the initial tax 
revenues without considering the social and economic consequences: 
FundiDi specific state programs with gambling revenues has tended to 
make them gambling-dependent. It bas also tended to make those groups who 
benefit ftom them part of pro-gambUng political constituencies.1O 
In this context, the main benefits allegedly generated by increased legalized 
gambling activities include not only new tax. revenues, but also new jobs and 
positive economic development The potential profit nuugins are so large that 
companies will invest millions of dollars to encourage the legalization of 
gambling activities in various states." In 1994, for example, at least 
516.5 million was spent in a losing campaign to bring casino gambling to 
Florida, 12 and at least 515 million was spent during two years on campaigns 
(including 58 million in the 1994 winning campaign) to bring video gambling 
terminals to Missouri.13 In 1992, approximately S5 mi1lion14 was spent by 
SUN TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1994. at 5 (almost 300% return on investment within 6 months for the 
Empress riverboat in UliDois). 
77. See. generally DAVID JOHNSTON, TEMPLES OF CHANcE: How AMElUCA INC. BoUGHT 
OUT MURDER INC. TO WIN CoNlROL OF 1lfE CAsINO BusINESS (1992). 
78. CEO REPoRT, ,.,.a note 21, at 18. 
79. Id 
80.ld 
81. See.. e..g .• SJ6.S MiNion Campaign. l1IfJ'a note 24. 
82. Id 
83. Slot Gomes In. npra note 17, at 6 (S15 million spent within two years by riverboat 
gambling propoDents). 
14. See. e.g., Patrick T. Reardon & Rick Pearson, Casino Finns Say Patience Tapped Out, 
CHI. 1'luB., Dec. 4,1992, §2, at 1,7($5 million). See also Stephen F. Simurda, When Gambling 
• 
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three companies to promote the possibility of a $2 billion casino complex in 
Chicago. IS However, skeptical economists emphasize that "any" influx of 
money to a community will create the appearance of economic development, 
and the socio-economic costs should not be overlooked.16 
Several studies by the gambling industry allegedly bolster the claims of 
economic benefits, and to examine these claims the Ford Foundation and the 
Aspen Institute funded a comprehensive 1994 report by the Center for 
EconOmic Development at the University of Massachusetts, which was entitled 
Legalized Gambling as. a Strategy for Economic Development 
(CED Report).B7 The CED Report analyZed fourteen industry studies, and in 
general. was highly critical of them.- Emphasizing that no state had a 
comprehensive development plan which analyzed legalizing gambling 
activities," the CEO Report concluded that "hiding the costsw90 was ap-
parently widespread and that legalizing gambling activities acted as economic 
"cannibalism'''1 on the pre-e~ng economy and ori other businesses.92 
In the social-welfare context, legalized gambling is widely-accepted as 
constituting a regressive tax on the poor. 93 In other words, governmental 
policies directed toward "~galizing" and encouraging gambling activities make 
poor people poorer and intensify many pre-existing social-welfare problems~94 
These socio-economic negatives are calculated to be extremely costly, and they 
parallel the negatives associated with alcohol and drug addiction." Substan-
tial changes and, in many instances, unpredictable consequences can be 
anticipated throughout the insurance industry (i.e., increased fraud in the 
Comes To Town, COLUM. J~ REv., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 36, 36 (S2 million spent to 
promote approval of a casino in ConDeCticut) [bereiDafter cited as CoLUM. JouRNALISM REv.]. 
8S. For a positive analysis of the Clicaao proposal. He CmcAOO GAMINO CoMM'N, 
EcoNOMIC AND OTHER IMPACTS OF A PRoPOSED GAMING, ENrERTAlNMENT AND HoTEL 
FACIUTY (May 19, 1992). COIItro, BETrER GoV'T ASSoc., STAFF WHITE PAPER.: CASINO 
GAMBLINO IN CHleMlO (1m) (a comprehCDIive and wcU-clocumeDted report) (hereinafter cited 
as 8B1TER. OoV'T Assoc. REPoIlTJ. 
86. See .. _rally BEnER GoV'T Assoc. REPoRT, supra note 85 (introductory statements 
by BOA President William Lear and Exec. Dir. Tenence Bnmner). 
87. CED REPoRT, "'Prtl note 21. 
88. Id. 'II: 16-19. 
89. Jd. II: 16. 
90.ld. 
91. Jd. II: 18,39, st. See 0180 Oold,IIIpI'tlDO«e 58, at 30. 
92. Gold. supra note Sa. at 30. 
93. Sa, e.g., CHARLEs T. CLo'rFELTER & PHn.IP J. CooK, SEwNG HoPE (Nat'l Bur. &on. 
Researc:b, H8Ivard Univ. Press 1989). 
94. Se. Economic IlIIpacU. If4PI'tlnote 18, at 61-70. 
95. Sa Durand F. Jacoba,Ilkgal and C1ntlot:IuntInIed: .4 Revin o/Teenage GaIIIbling and 
the PllgiIl a/Children olProbk", Galllblen 1n.4lnmca, in CONPuLsIVE GAMBLING: THEoRY, 
REsEARCH, AND PRACTICE 249, 252 (HoWll'd J. Shaffer et al. eels., 1989). 
S80 SAINT LOUIS UNlVERSflY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:S67 
billions of dollars).9\) the banking industry (Le., extended credit losses)97 and 
the general business community, including, for example, increased personnel 
costs," lost work productivity,99 and bankruptcies. loo 
In the national media, the costlbenefit debate involving increased legalized 
gambling has been growing in scope. As this trend continues, a 1994 article 
in the Columbia Jomnalism Review cautions the news media to ~'ftat out ask 
[experts, academics, and even other reporters] if they make money off the 
industry." 101 
96. Compulsive Gambling, supra note 28, at 45 (In 1992, insurance fraud due to Jegalized 
gambling activities was estimated at S1.3 billion.); see also Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, 
Insurance ProblelllS and Pathological Gambling, I. GAMBl.JNG BEMAV., Summer 1987, at 123. 
97. One interesting trend consists of legalized gaming establishments extending credit to 
customers. Having just been authorized in 1991, the Dlinois riverboats during 1993 were already 
legally extending $115 million in credit. Toby Eckert, Riverboats Give Gamblers $ J J 5 Million 
in Credit in '93, PEoRIA J. STAR, Apr. 17, 1994, at AI. 
98. Many oftbese increased personnel costs can be directly attributed to calculable increases 
in compulsive gamblers caused by the legalization of gambling activities. "Average" compulsive 
gamblers are those compulsive gamblers in the intermediate stage of gambling addiction. By 
comparison, the larger social costs are reflected in those compulsive gamblers who are in the later 
stages of gambling addiction and have "bottomed-out" RoBERT M. PoUTZER. ET AL., REPoRT 
ON nm SocIETAL COST OF PA1HOLOGlCAL GAMBLING AND THE COST-BENEFlTIEFFECTIVENESS 
OF TREATMENT at 9, 10 (1981). See also MARYLAND REPoRT, SflPra note 64, at 2, 59-61. It 
should be noted that.virtually all of these estimates are based on male subjects as recorded in the 
MARYLAND REPoRT. When adjusted for inflation as of 1992, the S52,OOO per year cost for each 
compulsive gambler increases to S53,ooo per year. BElTER GoV'T Assoc. REPoRT, supra 
note 8S, at 14. 
"Abused dollars" are defined as: "{e]stimates of the average annual amount obtained legally 
and/or Ulegally by the pathological gambler which otherwise would have been used by the 
pathological gambler, his family, or his victims for other essential purposes. These abused dollars 
include earned income put at risk in gambling, borrowed and/or illegally obtained dollars put at 
risk in gambling, borrowed and/or illegally obtained dollars spent on basic needs and/or provided 
to the fann1y whiclt otherwise would have been used for gambling, and borrowed and/or illegally 
obtained dollars for the partial payment of gambling related debts." PoLITZER. ET AL., supra, at 9, 
as cited in BETTER. GoV'T Assoc. REPoRT, rupra note 85, at IS. 
99 ... Lost work productivity" equates to the sociological concept of "lost productivity" and 
is defined as "[e]stimates ofpen:ent of time not engaged in the production of,oods and services 
for which the individual was employed, multiplied by the average IJ'OSS annual salary." POLJTZER 
ET AL., nIpl"a note 98, at 8 (emphasis in oriPnaI), as cited In BETTER. GoV'T Assoc. REPoRT, 
SJI[JI'anote 85, at 15~ Characteristic problems of the compulsive Pmbler include "inattention to 
work," pursuant to the American Psychiatric Association's DIAoNosnc AND STATISnCAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsoRDERs 324 (3d cd. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-lII]. 
100. Sipificant increases in bankruptcies oceumd in South Dakota after the advent of 
legalized gambling activities, particularly casino gambling and video lottery terminals (VI. Ts) in 
1989. See Todd Nelson, S.D. Btmkntptcies Down 5 Pereat: JwJge: Gambling Caused Most 
Casu, ARGUS LEADER, Jan. IS, 1993, at I. 
101. COWM. JOURNALISM REv., SJI[JI'a note 84, at 37-38. 
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Instinctively, several prestigious U.S. business groups have responded to 
these concerns. For example, in September of 1993, the eighty-five member 
Greater \\uhington, D.C. Board of Trade unanimously rejected the Mayor's 
proposal to bring casino-style gambling to ~hington, D.C.I02 
The gravamen of much of this debate is that state governments, by 
legalizing gambling activities, are creating large socia-economic problems 
which did not previously exist. It is well-established that by "legalizing" 
gambling activities (the "acceptability factor") and making those activities 
available to the public (the "accessibility factor"), state governments are 
creating a new population of addicted gamblers--a recognized addictive 
activity pursuant to the American Psychiatric Association (APA),I03 with 
parallels to alcohol and drug addictions. I04 From a baseline of .77%,105 the 
percentage of the adult population who are compulsive gamblers can easily rise 
to between 1.5 and 5% once gambling is legalized. lOO The percentage of 
teens who become compulsive gamblers generally ranges between four and six 
percent, but this range appears to be increasing. 107 
It is significant that compulsive gambling will probably hover at 
approximately .77% of the populationlO8 no matter what ethicists and 
102. Uz Spayd & Yolanda Woodlee, Trade Board &jects D.C. Casino Plan, WASH. PosT, 
Sept. 25, 1993, at AI. 
103. DSM-m, supra note 99, § 312.31 (Pathological Gambling). 
104. See Jacobs, supra note 95, at 252. 
]05. COMM'N ON GAMBLING, supra note 29, at 73. 
] 06. For a table showing prevalence rates of problem and probable pathological gamblers at 
between 1.7 and 6.9% for adults, see ALTA. LolTEIUEs AND GAMING, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM 
GAMBLING IN ALBERTA at 18 (1994) (Native Americans in one study equaled 14.S%). 
107. Id. (showing prevalence rates between 3.6 and 12.4% for teenagers); BETrER GoV'T 
Assoc. REPoRT, supra note 85, at 30 (between 4 and IS% of high-schoolers are "problem 
gamblers"-iIOt to be confUsed with "compulsive gamblers" which are subsumed in the category 
of "problem gamblers"). For analyses of compulsive and problem gambling among teenagers, 
see Jacobs, ntpranote 95, at 252 (reporting five studies). See also Robert Ladauceur &. Chantel 
MireauIt, Gtzmbling Behaviors Among High School SlUdems in the Quebec Area, 4 J. GAMBLING 
BEHAv. 3 (1988); Henry R Lesieur &. Robert Klein. Pathological Gambling A.1IIfJng High School 
Stlldents, 12 ADDICTIVE BEHAv. 129 (1987). See geMra/1y Michael L. Frank, Untkrage 
Gambling in Atlantic City Casinos, 67 PsYCHOL. REP. 907 (1990). Clinical Professor of 
Psy~ Durand lacobs of the Lorna Linda University Medical School sets the overall 
percentap of teenage compulsive gamblers at 4 to 6%. . 
101. CoMM'N ON GAMBLING, suPra note 29. at 73. This study apparendy provides the most 
authoritative historical baseline in this as well as other pmbling-relared issue areas. It should 
be noted that tileR are considerable definitional debates regarding what constitutes a "compulsive 
or pathological gambler," a "probable compulsive gambler," and a "potential compulsive 
gambler." The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOOS) appears to be the most generally accepted 
current mechanism for delimiting these categories. Henry R Lesieur &: Sheila B. Blwne, The 
South 0aJa Gambling Screen (the SOGs): A. New 11I8tnlme1lt for the Identification 0/ 
Pathological Gamblers, 144 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 1]84 (1987). 
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governments do to eradicate or solve this problem. However, the interesting 
statistic is that once state governments legalize gambling-<lnce gambling 
receives the Imprimatur of government and becomes not only "sociologically 
acceptable"but also is advertised as such-the number of compulsive gamblers 
~U increase from .77% to between 1.5 and 5% of the population. Thus. in 
a state with a population of 10 million, the number of compulsive gamblers 
would increase from 77,000 to between 150,000 and 500,000. There is some 
debate about how fast this increase will occur, but it will definitely occw: For 
example, in South DakotaIG9~which had no legalized-gambling per se before 
the state lottery in 1987, but which initiated more legalized gambling in 
October 1989 via land-based casinos and video-lottery terminals (VLT's)-the 
best data strongly suggests that an additional one percent of the population 
(approximately 7,000 people)IIO became "addicted" within two years. These _ 
numbers include the adolescent population, which is already reflecting twice 
the addiction rate of the adult population. 
The social, business, economic and governmental costs of this phenomenon 
are potentially catastrophic. The average socio-economic cost per compulsive 
gambler per year has been calculated at SS3,000.11I Therefore, by 
"legalizing" land-based casino gambling and VLT's, the South Dakota 
legislature has created, within two years, an additirnal $371 million per year 
in economic and social costs to its citizens. The negative numbers generated 
by this phenomenon are so large that they demand to be checked and 
rechecked, but even if they are smaller by half,1I2 the negative numbers are 
significant enough to predict major problems for U.S. societ)', business and 
government 
UI. CONCLUSION 
. Throughout the twentieth centur); the U.S. economy has operated within 
a type of pristine economic environment uncontaminated by widespread 
Jegalized gambling. HoweveJ; because pro-gambling philosophies are 
spreading rapidly throughout the United States, and the governmental 
infatuation with legalized gambling is so pervasive, the impacts of lePtized 
gambling will soon be felt throughout the local, state and federal governmental 
systems-regardless of whether a particular state bas or has not legalized a 
109. South Dakota bas a population of 700,000 people. U.s. BUR. CENsus (1993). 
110. Eco1lOlllic IIllpflCll. 8up1'tI note 18, at 74. 
111. Su Bm'EIl OOV'TAssoc. REPoRT, npra DOte 85, at 14 (SS3,000Iyr. is adjusted for 
iDflaticm in 1992 dollars) (citing to PoLrrzER ET AL., 6Ip"QDOte 98). By 1994 tile nmge of cost 
estimates bepn to fluct1Jall between S13.2oo aacl $53,000. with most est.imeIes begi1miD& to 
8JOUP II'OUIld $13,200 to 535,000. s.e Congo HearlIIg. 8rIpI"tl DOte 9, at 80 n.12 (statement of 
Professor .101m W. Kindt, UDiverIity of minois) (citiDa studies). 
J 12. &e SIIfJ'O DOte J 11 and accompanyins text. 
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particular form of gambling. Academic disciplines will change and the 
standard economic fonnulas will have to be modified to accommodate the 
economic impacts of the gambling industry. Education will suffer both 
philosophically and fiscally as educational budgets are redirected toward 
addressing the increasing social-welfare costs. 
The criminal justice system will incur not only increased costs, but the 
types of crimes will change to redress new forms of misconduct like gamblers 
unfairly beating the odds or "cheating" the legalized gambling operations. 
Financial institutions and banks will experience rapid and perhaps de-
stabilizing impacts as pre-existing assets and large proportions of fixed 
consumer assets are diverted into legalized gambling activities. Bad debts and 
increased insurance fraud are projected to increase significantly.113 
If the gambling trends of the 1990's continue, the negative impacts of 
gambling activities will prolong recessionary trends and slow recoveries in 
iocal, state and national economies. The economic history of the United States 
has indicated that the U.S. public has intermittently flirted with gambling and 
repeatedly rejected it as economically and sociologically unworkable. 
Legislators who forget this economic history and promote legalized gambling 
are subject to being criticized as mere mechanics. n4 Those who forget the 
economic lessons of history are condemned to relive them. lIS 
If the U.S. public liked the "\\ar on Crime" and the "\\ar on Drugs,,' the 
public will be enthralled with the forthcoming "\\m on GambJing.,,116 The 
tragedy is that unlike the first two "wars" on social ills, the "\\ar on 
Gambling" can still be avoided-simply by not decriminalizing or otherwise 
legalizing gambling activities. In other words, it will take affirmative 
government action to magnify a minor social ill into a major socia-economic 
problem. 
113. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
114. This statement is a paraphrase of "[a] lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic . 
. .. " Ouy Mannering, as quoted in J. BAR11..EIT, FAMILIAR QuoTATIONS 520 (14th ed. 1968). 
115. Id. at 507. While this phrase bas been paraphrased by many authors, it probably 
originated with historian Georg Hegel. 
116. See John W. Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalt;:ed Gambling Operations: The Impact 
on the $odo-Economics of Business and Government, 43 CRlM. L. BULL. 538,538-39 (1994). 
For an authoritative 1994 reaftinnation of the principle that increased crime' accompanies 
legalizing gambling activities, see piA DEP'T L. ENFORCEMENT, THE QUESTION OF CASINOS IN 
FLORIDA: INCREASED CiuME: Is IT WORTH TIfE GAMBLE? (1994). 
As this· report reflects. it has been clearly domonstrated in other jmisdictiODS that a 
significant increase in crime and its consequences accompanies casino gambling. FDLE 
joins a large number of other criminal justice entities in opposition to any form of 
/ega/ad casino gambling. , 
Id. at 2. See also COMM'N ON GAMBLING, supra note 29, at 1; NJ. REPoRT AND REcOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE GoVERNOR'S ADVISORY CoMM'N ON GAMBLING 19 (1988). 
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. Governmental officials are increasingly being enticed to acCept and then 
impose upon the public those discredited economic philosophies which claim 
that gambling activities increase jobs, foster economic development, and 
generate new tax revenue~n without raising taxes on the electorate. In 
reali~ the regional and strategic impacts of legalized gambling almost 
invariably result in a net loss of jobs, i~reased taxes, and a negative economic 
spiral which is inherently recessiOlUJ11C 
In 1988, the national societal costs of alcohol abuse were calculated at 
S 120 billion, and the costs of other substance abuse were calculated at 
$60 billion. \l1 By comparison, ttse national societal costs for compulsive 
gambling were calculated at S80 billion and were fOlUld to be increasing 
rapidly; II 8 howevez; wtlike alcohol and substance abuse, the costs of 
compulsive gambling are less obvious because the abused substance is 
money, 119 and some of these costs translate into lost work productivity. 
In practically all. disciplines, the strategic negatives associated with 
gambling activities are so Ialp that the conclusions in this analysis might seem 
somewhat alamist: The strategic figures, boweveJ; appear to constitute the 
best evidence available within those parameters which academic autlt'ority can 
establish at this jWlCture in business-economic history. As confirmed by the 
1994 CEO Report, 120 the Florida Department of Commerce Report, 121 and 
the 1994 congressional hear:ing.l22 the gambling adherents have little solid 
data or authority supporting their statements about the many alleged social 
benefits of legalized gambling activities.l23 
Regardless of these considerationS, it appears to be widely-accepted that 
U.S. economic strength constitutes a sine qUl1 non of worldwide economic 
stability. Any indUstry which has a growth rate as substantial as that of the 
legalized gambling industry and which has the potential to cannibalize the 
pre-existing economy with a potential negative multiplier effectl24 needs to 
be closely examined. At a minimum, a national commission to investigate the 
economic claims of the industry is necessary; In the interim, prudent s1rategic 
national policy necessitates that there be a federal moratorium on any increases 
in the various forms of legalized gambling activities or increases in its 
pogra.pbical expansion. 
117. MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 64, at 60. 
118. [d. at 59. 
I J 9. 9ft Jd. It 20-28. 
120. CEO REPoIlT, 8IIpI'Q note 21, at 16-19. 
121. FLA. CEP'T CoM. REPoRT, 8fI/I1'tI note 71, at 2, 5-6. 
122. &e CONG. FfIwuNo, IIIIP'Q DOte 9 panim. 
123. 8ETrER Gov'T Assoc. REPoRT, nIpI'tlnote 85, at 2-21. 
J 24. See SfIJJI't1 notes "', 90-92 IDd accomplllying text. 
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